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RESUMO: Este artigo se propõe a 
examinar a questão da inovação 
colaborativa entre empresas em quatro 
etapas. Primeiro, analiso as principais 
características do paradigma de produção da 
“Nova Economia”, onde as empresas são 
cada vez mais obrigadas a estabelecer 
relações de colaboração para se manterem 
competitivas no mercado. Segundo, 
examino as principais formas de 
colaboração entre empresas estabelecidas e 
as formas correspondentes de desenho legal 
das transações. Terceiro, descrevo os 
principais desafios legais de coordenação 
para que essas colaborações sejam eficazes. 
Quarto, concluo mencionando as formas 
potenciais pelas quais as regras de comércio 
internacional ou guias legislativos podem 
contribuir para facilitar e encorajar 
colaborações inovadoras entre empresas 
legalmente independentes para inovar. 
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RESUMEN: Este artículo propone examinar 
el tema de la innovación colaborativa entre 
empresas en cuatro etapas. En primer lugar, 
analizo las principales características del 
paradigma productivo de la “Nueva 
Economía”, donde las empresas se ven cada 
vez más obligadas a establecer relaciones de 
colaboración para seguir siendo 
competitivas en el mercado. En segundo 
lugar, examino las principales formas de 
colaboración entre empresas establecidas y 
las correspondientes formas de diseño de 
transacciones legales. En tercer lugar, 
describo los principales desafíos legales de 
la coordinación para que estas 
colaboraciones sean efectivas. En cuarto 
lugar, concluyo mencionando las posibles 
formas en que las reglas de comercio 
internacional o las directrices legislativas 
pueden contribuir a facilitar y fomentar 
colaboraciones innovadoras entre empresas 
legalmente independientes para innovar. 
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ABSTRACT: This paper proposes to 
examine the issue of collaborative inter-
firm innovation in four steps. In the first, I 
analyze the main features of the “New 
Economy” production paradigm, where 
companies increasingly are required to 
establish collaborative relationships to 
remain competitive in the market. Second, 
I examine the main forms of inter-firm 
collaborations established and the 
corresponding forms of legal design of the 
transactions. Third, I describe the main 
legal challenges of coordination for these 
collaborations to be effective. Fourth, I 
conclude mentioning the potential ways 
through which international trade rules or 
legislative guides could contribute to 
facilitating and encouraging innovative 
collaborations between legally 
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As the next generation of advancements in science and technology becomes growingly 
unpredictable, companies are hardly capable to produce world class innovation without 
establishing collaborations with other entities. Many complex and innovative products and 
services are the result of strategic alliances between competing companies to collaboratively 
co-create. BMW and Toyota have a strategic alliance to create fuel cell technology; Apple and 
Samsung have a collaboration to produce semiconductors for mobile phones1. 
Some of these relationships, especially those that display a high degree of uncertainty and 
present the need for experimentation, do not fit easily within the traditional Private Law 
categories such as contracts, corporations or partnerships, but rather require adaptations or a 
different logic. Moreover, parties growingly insert tailored governance mechanisms in their 
agreements to navigate the difficulties presented by these relationships. As innovation becomes 
paramount to assure companies’ productivity and competitiveness, so becomes the need to 
examine the design of legal transactions structuring these innovative projects. 
This paper proposes to examine this issue in four steps. In the first, I analyze the main 
features of the “New Economy” production paradigm, where companies increasingly are 
required to establish collaborative relationships to remain competitive in the market. Second, I 
examine the main forms of inter-firm collaborations established and the corresponding forms 
of legal design of the transactions. Third, I describe the main legal challenges of coordination 
for these collaborations to be effective. Fourth, I conclude mentioning the potential ways 
through which international trade rules or legislative guides could contribute to facilitating and 














1 THE “NEW ECONOMY” PRODUCTION PARADIGM: DE-VERTICALIZATION, 
GLOBALIZATION, PROBLEM-SOLVING 
 
In the past few years, academics2, the business community3 and international 
organizations4 have widely debated the rise of a new industrial production paradigm, one where 
companies operate in a state of constant innovation and establish strong collaborative 
relationships with other firms. Such debates were initially triggered by the finding that key 
companies were no longer fully developing products and production processes in-house, but 
rather through cooperation with one or several other companies.5 This was coined a process of 
“de-verticalization” of the economy, where companies, instead of controlling the full process 
of production or distribution, focus on their core expertise, and establish different forms of 
collaboration not only with other companies, but also with research institutes, universities, 
customers, among others, having in view assembling an output to be offered in the market (thus 
the concept of “open innovation”).   
This process of de-verticalization propagated in a globalized context. The intensification 
of world trade and economic integration has propitiated the creation of global value chains.6 
Companies all over the world have become connected in value chains where each of them 
performs a certain function for the set-up of the final output. The process of production of a 
commercial aircraft is emblematic of this transnational collaboration. For instance, in the set-
up of the Boeing 787, Boeing, the leading company assembling the aircraft, established 
collaborations with several companies, from different countries from all over the world, each 
 
2 HERRIGEL, Gery B. Manufacturing Possibilities: Creative Action and Industrial Recomposition in the US, 
Germany and Japan. Oxford: Oxford University Press: 2010. 
3 LIKER, J.; CHOI, Thomas Y. Building Deep Supplier Relationships. Harvard Business Review. Massachusetts. 
Dezembro 2004. Disponível em: https://hbr.org/2004/12/building-deep-supplier-relationships.. 
4 WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM. Collaborative Innovation, Transforming Business, Driving Growth - Regional 
Report.  Agosto de 2015.  
5 GILSON, Ronald J.; SABEL, Charles F.; SCOTT, Robert E. Contracting for innovation: vertical disintegration 
and interfirm collaboration. Colum. L. Rev., v. 109, p. 431, 2009. 
6 GEREFFI, Gary. A global value chain perspective on industrial policy and development in emerging markets. 





of them with strong expertise on a certain component or service, and all of them collaborating 
and coordinating their respective performances towards the assembly of the final output.7 
Furthermore, this process of globalized de-verticalization has, especially in the innovative 
companies, often established a model of production for the rapid detection of defects, with 
specialization in the problem-solving abilities to deal with the identified issues and to improve 
them.8 In the past, the process of mass production in factories was the rule, with an inventory 
of replacements for inputs or machines once defects were encountered as a way to assuring the 
uninterrupted functioning of the process of production. Nowadays, it becomes growingly 
common for companies to adopt the strategy of stopping the process of production once 
problems are detected, of identifying the bottlenecks, and of investing highly in problem-
solving capabilities to solve them as quickly as possible. This procedure has, in many cases, led 
to better and cheaper production processes and outputs. Moreover, this “Toyota system of 
production” led to increases in productivity and innovation. 
 
2 MODELS OF INTER-FIRM COOPERATION: RELATIONAL, MODULAR, CO-
DESIGN 
 
The models of inter-firm cooperation established in the context of global value chains is 
varied. According to the nature of the product being developed and to its complexity, different 
models of cooperation are more suitable. In general, it is possible to identify three main forms 
of collaboration: modular, relational and co-design or iterative collaboration (the truly 
collaborative model, involving risk partnerships).9  
In the modular model, each party has to provide a certain service or a product that will be 
directly incorporated into the final output. Each party provides its own closed “module”, 
initially determined by the parties and produced independently, and in the end the modules from 
the different companies are assembled to form a final product. In this situation, formal contracts 
will be mostly sufficient for the parties to establish cooperation. The specifics of the module 
 
7 JENNEJOHN, Matthew C. Contract adjudication in a collaborative economy. Va. L. & Bus. Rev., v. 5, p. 173, 
2010. 
8 SPEAR, Steven J. Chasing the Rabbit: How Market Leaders Outdistance the Competition and How Great 
Companies Can Catch Up and Win, Foreword by Clay Christensen. McGraw Hill Professional, 2008.4 
9 SABEL, Charles F.; ZEITLIN, Jonathan. Neither modularity nor relational contracting: Inter-firm collaboration 





are established contractually, acts of contractual violation can be detected with reasonable ease, 
and prices and terms are predicted or predictable. The difficulty with the modular model is that 
it might obstruct the parties’ efforts to improve the overall product, tying them to a second-best 
technology. As the parties are obliged to provide components with fixed features (which will 
be directly incorporated into the final product), this undermines their ability to improve them 
along the production process, as they discover better technologies along their problem-solving 
activities, or to correct potential inefficiencies. The modular model, thus, presents serious 
difficulties for parties seeking to innovate. 
An alternative is the relational model, where parties establish a continuous and more open 
cooperation, drafting vague and short contracts, with few formal enforceable terms. In this 
situation, thus, there are several uncertainties and contingencies that might arise in the parties’ 
relationship, which often are not predicted contractually. In case a controversy arises, therefore, 
most of the disputes among the parties are to be decided informally, with no need for formal 
contractual enforcement, except in case of partial or complete break-down of the relationship. 
The main incentives against opportunism and non-cooperative behavior would be the 
expectation for future deals with the other partner, as well as concerns as to reputation in the 
market, which could be damaged if information about the misbehavior against the contractual 
partner were to be spread to other companies.10 While the relational model remains valid and 
efficient in some kinds of transactions, several studies have acknowledged that it is not the 
predominant model of cooperation for project involving advanced innovation, some of them 
presenting empirical evidence to support that assertion.11 Several reasons justify the inadequacy 
of the relational model for innovation. First, the fact that, given the high level of preliminary 
investments required, parties are reluctant not to establish a more sophisticated legal machinery 
(including governance mechanisms) to protect their interests. Second, the high uncertainty 
involved in innovation can lead to misunderstandings as to the behavior of the other party: it is 
difficult to determine whether it is duly cooperating (by experimenting) or whether it is 
 
10 MACAULAY, Stewart. Non-contractual relations in business: A preliminary study. In: CAMPBELL, David. 
Stewart Macaulay: Selected Works. Springer, Cham, 1963. p. 361-377. 
11 BOZOVIC, Iva; HADFIELD, Gillian K. Scaffolding: Using formal contracts to build informal relations in 
support of innovation. USC CLASS Research Paper, n. C12-3, p. 12-6, 2015.  
BERNSTEIN, Lisa. Beyond relational contracts: Social capital and network governance in procurement contracts. 
Journal of Legal Analysis, v. 7, n. 2, p. 561-621, 2015. 
JENNEJOHN, Matthew. The private order of innovation networks. Stan. L. Rev., v. 68, p. 281, 2016.  





defecting (evading its legal obligations).12 Simple relational incentives are insufficient for the 
parties to understand each other’s actions. Third, it is uncertain to what extent the reputational 
or business sanctions, crucial for the effectiveness of the relational model, remain valid in the 
context of transactions taking place in a global level, where companies are operating in huge 
markets and in different countries. Finally, self-regulation in long-term relationships between 
the partners on the basis of social norms and reputation fails because it depends on mechanisms 
of punishment that by themselves will contribute to destroy the basis of the relationship – trust 
and cooperation.13 For if one party is actively seeking to punish the other for their mistakes, 
there will be a tendency of each party taking a cautious and suspicious behavior that will be 
deleterious to cooperation. 
The third model is co-design or iterative collaboration. According to Gilson et al, 
contractual transactions to generate innovation share three different features.14 First, the project 
of an innovative product, to be produced under a continuous process of high uncertainty, in 
which the final output, price and process are not definable at the outset. Second, the inability of 
just one firm to produce such innovation – requiring, thus, inter-firm alliances. Third, an 
iterative collaboration between members of different firms, working towards the specification, 
design and development of an innovative product, involving intense communication and 
sharing of information.  
In this study, I will be focusing specifically on innovative ventures. Most of the advanced 
innovation is bound to occur through co-design or iterative collaboration – for most companies, 
no matter how big, do not have the expertise to generate world class innovation alone, especially 
in capital intensive industries. These inter-firm collaborative relationships are clearly different 
from traditional forms of supplying or outsourcing relationships. They involve a close 
collaborative relationship between companies, with, for instance, the exchange of technology 
and know-how, the creation of inter-firm joint working teams, online platforms for joint 
planning and sharing of information and the creation of steering committees between different 
companies for decision-making regarding upcoming disputes and contingencies. They require 
specific preliminary investments of each of the firms for the joint project, making the partners 
 
12 GILSON, Ronald J.; SABEL, Charles F.; SCOTT, Robert E. Braiding: the interaction of formal and informal 
contracting in theory, practice, and doctrine. Columbia Law Review, p. 1377-1447, 2010. 
13 DEAKIN, Simon; LANE, Christel; WILKINSON, Frank. 'Trust'or Law? Towards an Integrated Theory of 
Contractual Relations between Firms. Journal of Law and Society, v. 21, n. 3, p. 329-349, 1994. 





gradually more valuable to each other, thus shunning the adversarial logic of the market. At the 
same time, these projects involve high risks as to their feasibility (Can a new form of high-
storage energy battery be developed and commercialized? Can genetically modified seeds for 
a certain plant be effectively generated?). These high risks require the project to allow for a 
high degree of flexibility: if the project seems not to be developing promisingly, the parties 
should be free to walk-away. Such characteristics generate the need for an “experimental” 
model of business that calls for two apparently paradoxical demands: full trust and cooperation, 
coupled with a high degree of freedom and flexibility to change the relationship, if there is a 
need to adapt the project, or even to terminate it, in case the experiment seems to be leading 
nowhere. 
An example of a collaborative network of contracts for innovation illustrates how these 
features manifest. As some automotive industries, Chrysler undertook restructuring of its 
commercial relationships with suppliers in the United States during the 1990’s. 15 Its objective 
was to engage its suppliers of components in product and process development, seeking to 
achieve more innovation and cutting costs of production. It downsized the number of its 
suppliers and started developing a closer relationship with a few chosen firms. The selected 
suppliers were not sought according to the lower prices offered, but according to capabilities 
which could eventually lead to optimized production. Instead of having short-term relationships 
involving detailed contracts, long-term open contracts were concluded. The components’ prices 
were commonly agreed and revised between the parties along the way, according to a “target 
costing”, calculating how much the final customer would pay for the product and then 
calculating the price of components backwards to see how much would be the contribution of 
each supplier to the final product.  
Chrysler managers themselves, however, acknowledged that the target costing was set 
“somewhat unscientifically and then, when necessary, [we] had the suppliers convince us that 
another number was better”.16 The plan of production, instead of being imposed by Chrysler on 
the suppliers, was elaborated collaboratively with them, through the creation of “cross-
functional teams”, where technicians of Chrysler and different suppliers’ employees met to plan 
the optimization of production jointly. It created a platform program for communication, where 
 
15 DYER, Jeffrey H. How Chrysler created an American keiretsu. Harvard Business Review, v. 74, n. 4, p. 42-52, 
1996. 





suppliers gave suggestions for the improvements of Chrysler’s processes for which, if 
implemented, the supplier would receive some reward. As this example demonstrates, in a 
network, the companies become interdependent and their relationship is based on trust and 
cooperation, yet they maintain their independent legal personality. Chrysler restructuring of its 
relationship with its suppliers led to significant improvements in its processes of production, 
leading to more efficiency and profits. 
 
3 LEGAL ISSUES REGARDING COLLABORATIVE INNOVATIVE PROJECTS: 
BEYOND THE TRADITIONAL LEGAL CATEGORIES  
 
For legal studies, this emerging business model posed an initial obvious challenge: these 
relationships could not be clearly framed within traditional private law categories of company 
law or contract law. While the production involved close collaboration, the companies 
themselves were legally independent – and often they did not pertain to the same economic 
group/reality. At the same time, the level of interdependence between the companies, the strong 
degree of interaction between them created intense duties of co-operation, information, 
monitoring, beyond those prescribed by the traditional duties of good faith in contract law – 
especially if one considers common law jurisdictions. Partnerships could present an alternative, 
but the fiduciary logic in partnerships (giving preference to the partners interests, rather than to 
its own) contradicted the experimentalist logic of collaborative projects, where parties should 
be given the freedom to compete and collaborate simultaneously. 
The search for legal institutional frameworks adequate to govern hybrids such as 
networks of contracts, located in the intersection between the market and the firm, became a 
rising tendency, especially from the 1990’s, when a significant literature on contractual 
networks emerged in Europe17. While the recognition of the failures of traditional contract law 
were acknowledged, no alternative concrete legal framework could be advanced in this first 
 
17 See, for instance:   
TEUBNER, Gunther. Beyond Contract and Organization? External Liability of Franchising Systems in German 
Law. In: JOERGES, Christian. Franchising and the Law: Theoretical and Comparative Approaches in Europe 
and the United States, 1991. 
SCHANZE, E. Symbiotic Contracts: Exploring Long-Term Agency Structures Between Contract and Corporation. 
In: JOERGES, Christian. Franchising and the Law: Theoretical and Comparative Approaches in Europe and the 
United States, 1991. 
ADAMS, John N.; BROWNSWORD, Roger. Privity and the Concept of a Network Contract. Legal Studies, v. 





moment. From the mid-2000’s, the interest on contractual networks in Europe re-emerged 
strongly, with new proposals as to how to materialize an institutional framework for networks 
(such as the concept of connected contracts in Germany or the Italian legislation on “network-
contract”).18 Nonetheless these efforts, the literature in the field is classified by a leading expert 
as still being in its “infancy”.19 
It is indeed important to notice that the search for a legal concept of contractual networks 
has been far more significant in Europe than in the US, where it seems that there is an implied 
acceptance that most of the specific challenges of contractual networks should be decided on 
an ad-hoc basis, rather than on a systematic fashion. I claim that the reason for that is that there 
is a greater belief among US scholars that contractual networks can be most efficiently self-
regulated by their participants20, which has lead them to focus on the study of private 
agreements’ design and contractual governance mechanisms between the contractual partners, 
which is more developed than in Europe. In Europe, however, legal scholars such as Teubner 
have persuasively argued that there are some significant issues (such as profit sharing and 
network liability towards third parties) where the courts and the legal doctrine have an important 
role to play.21 These doctrinal discussions, on their turn, seem to be more advanced in Europe 
than in the US. Moreover, they seem to have pointed towards a need for the legal doctrine to 
evolve towards some definition of contractual network (even if only to remain a guiding rather 
than a legal concept), a definition that seems to be less important in the US. in contrast, in other 
regions such as Latin America, the doctrinal formulation of contractual networks seems to me 
to be mostly associated with the concept of linked contracts (credit card chains’, franchising, 
purchasing finance), with a lack of any major discussion regarding contractual networks in the 
context of productive networks involving a high degree of interdependence and working 
 
18 See, for instance:   
CAFAGGI, F.; GRUNDMANN, S.; VETTORI, G. The Organizational Contract - From Exchange to Long-Term 
Network Cooperation in European Contract Law. London: Routledge, 2016.  
CAFAGGI, F. Contractual Networks, Inter-firm Cooperation and Economic Growth. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar 
Pub. 2011.  
TEUBNER, Gunther. Networks as Connected Contracts. London: Bloomsbury Publishing PLC, 2011.  
JUNG, S; KREBS, P; TEUBNER, G. Business Networks Reloaded. Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 
2015.  
19 GRUNDMANN, Stefan. The Future of Contract Law. European Review of Contract Law, v. 7, n. 4. P 490-525, 
2011 
20 BUXBAUM, Richard M. Is" Network" a Legal Concept?. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 
(JITE)/Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft, v. 149, n. 4, p. 698-705, 1993. 





collaboration between contractual partners. I believe this absence is related to the fact that the 
most advanced forms of production (Post-Fordism) in Latin America are still confined to a very 
small proportion of the productive sector. The most recent developments in the US recognize 
the development of contractual agreements mixing formal and informal elements to deal with 
inter-firm arrangements for collaborative production22 - as demonstrated by studies across 
law23, management24 and economics.25 
 
4 CHALLENGES TO BE OVERCOME IN THE COORDINATION OF 
COLLABORATIVE INTER-FIRM PROJECTS 
 
In overview, there are three main features of long-term contracts that are not adequately 
taken into account by rules governing spot contracts that serve as a paradigm for traditional 
Contract Law. All these issues are present and intensified in contracts for innovation, requiring 
taking further steps even in relation to the treatment of long-term contracts. First, the inherent 
uncertainty (or incompleteness) of these contracts; second, the specific investments often 
necessary in such contracts; and, third, the different incentives regime in contracting that 
requires adjustment of termination rules and allocation of opportunities.26  
The first issue, the inherent uncertainty in long-term contracts, relates to the impossibility 
to predict the contingencies that might arise in the long-run of the contract performance.27 
Beyond that, in the field of innovation, it is common that not even in the initial stages it may be 
possible to predict what a project will be or what are the parties’ obligations (even if it is a 
short-term project).28 An illustrative example is that of a computer manufacturer buying 
 
22 Gilson et al, op. cit. 2010, páginas 1377-1378. 
23 DEAKIN et al. Contract Law, Trust Relations, and Incentives for Co-operation: a Comparative Study. In: 
DEAKIN et al. Contracts, Co-Operation, and Competition: Studies in Economics, Management, and Law. Oxônia: 
Oxford University Press, 1998. 
24 DYER, Jeffrey H.; SINGH, Harbir. The relational view: Cooperative strategy and sources of interorganizational 
competitive advantage. Academy of management review, v. 23, n. 4, p. 660-679, 1998. 
25 On the concept of hybrids by New Institutional Economics, see: WILLIAMSON, Oliver E. The economic 
institutions of capitalism. Firms, markets, relational contracting. In: Das Summa Summarum des Management. 
Gabler, 2007. p. 61-75. 
26 GRUNDMANN, Stefan; CAFAGGI, Fabrizio; VETTORI, Giuseppe. The Contractual Basis of Long-Term 
Organization–The Overall Architecture. In: GRUNDMANN, S., CAFAGGI, F. VETTORI G. The Organizational 
Contract. London: Routledge, 2016. p. 3-38. 
27 BELL, John. The Effect of Changes in Circumstances on Long-term Contracts. In: HARRIS, D.; TALLON, D. 
Contract Law Today: Anglo-French Comparisons. 1989.  





regularly circuit boards from another company.29 While there may be an initial description of 
the product, the buyer expects to cooperate closely with the partner company to constantly 
produce innovations in the components – which otherwise will rapidly become obsolete due to 
the rapidly changing nature of the field. This might not only lead to a different product, but to 
a different price and contractual reality that is impossible to predict at the outset.  
The second issue is the need for specific investments in some long-term contracts.30 It is 
common that, in preparation for a contractual agreement or for its performance, one contractual 
partner has to make investments tailored to the project at hand. These investments will be 
considered specific when the products/services in which they result will not be marketable to 
third companies in case the long-term relationship is terminated. For instance, a component 
produced specifically for a model of machine used only by the contractor cannot be sold to third 
companies in the market that do not employ the same model. The non-marketability of these 
products creates a vulnerability for the party who made the investments in regard to its 
contractual partner. When the investments are considerable and when the other party has not 
undertaken a same level of investments in the project, this creates a risk for the non-investing 
party to act opportunistically, as it knows that the investing party has to maintain the contract 
or it will lose its investments. It may then seek to opportunistically renegotiate the contract, 
asking for abusively lower prices or asking for inadequate advantages.  
The third issue is the incentive structure of long-term contracts, which should be markedly 
different from that of spot contracts due to the repeated dealings in which the parties are 
involved.31 In long-term contracts, parties are continuously performing their contractual 
obligations (as opposed to fulfilling their obligations in a one-time performance). In this context 
of repeated dealings, it is crucial to create “warning” mechanisms that permit a contractual party 
to immediately sanction the inadequate performance of the contract by the other party rather 
than wait for the end of the contractual term. Similarly, the termination mechanisms have to be 
calibrated for long-term contracts. Sometimes, allowing an inadequate performance to lead to 
termination may favor the party who less invested in the project to exit or to blackmail the other 
party.   
 
29 Ibid, página 465 
30 WILLIAMSON, Oliver E. Transaction-cost economics: the governance of contractual relations. The journal of 
Law and Economics, v. 22, n. 2, p. 233-261, 1979.  






5 POTENTIAL AREAS OF STUDY FOR INTERNATIONAL TRADE 
ORGANIZATIONS 
 
In this section, I propose potential legal recommendations in different areas of study that 
could be developed by international trade organizations having in view facilitating and 
encouraging innovative collaborative inter-firm relationships. 
 
5.1 GOVERNANCE MECHANISMS AND LEGAL DESIGN 
 
In practice, the first attempt to deal with the challenges in inter-firm collaborative 
relationships to innovate is by the parties establishing themselves governance mechanisms that 
could contribute to solve coordination problems, to reduce the risks of opportunism and to 
enhance communication between companies. Furthermore, the overall legal design of the 
contract is an important issue for the contract to provide for a balance of rights and obligations.  
A series of legal studies have analyzed the potential of such governance mechanisms, 
examining the creation and functions of steering committees (or contractual boards) in the 
context of strategic alliances32, financial incentives33, non-compete clauses’ role in producing 
innovation34, the use of advanced technology to foster coordination and collaboration between 
contractual partners35, the use of outsourcing relationships to develop specific forms of 
governance36  and a blending of formal and informal law (braiding) in designing collaborative 
relationships. 37 There was a fragmented account of the different contractual elements to 
structure collaborative relationships in innovative ventures. These studies culminated with the 
deployment of a more developed general theory for contracting for innovation with a series of 
 
32 SMITH, D. Gordon. The exit structure of strategic alliances. U. Ill. L. Rev., p. 303, 2005. 
33 DENT, George. Lawyers and trust in business alliances. Bus. LAw., v. 58, p. 45, 2002. 
34 Ibid. página 53. 
35 CIRCO, Carl J. A case study in collaborative technology and the intentionally relational contract: Building 
information modeling and construction industry contracts. Ark. L. Rev., v. 67, p. 873, 2014. (discussing the use of 
the Building Information Modelling – BIM – as a technology facilitating collaboration between partners in the 
construction industry). 
36 GEIS, George S. The space between markets and hierarchies. Virginia Law Review, p. 99-153, 2009. See also: 
GEIS, George S. An empirical examination of business outsourcing transactions. Virginia Law Review, p. 241-
300, 2010. 






articles by GILSON, SABEL and SCOTT38, which incorporated some of the different 
mechanisms of contractual governance aforementioned. They incorporated in their narrative, to 
a great deal, the different elements insofar studied only in a fragmented way. Their theory has 
been influential in academic studies. 
Indeed, GILSON et al defend that formal and informal rules coexist in the context of 
contracts for innovation in the following manner. These contracts contain a few formal 
enforceable rules that impose upon the parties the participation in processes of cooperation that 
make the behavior of each party more observable.39 These processes or “contractual 
milestones” are moments where the parties have to come together to cooperate. As they 
cooperate, they will check their compatibility and will be able to decide whether to continue 
cooperating or not. The contracts will not impose the project to be pursued to the end, but as 
the parties decide to voluntarily keep on cooperating, the costs of switching partners will 
become higher.40 As the parties have voluntarily continued cooperating, they invested in each 
other, acquired know-how and expertise related to the other company, developed 
communication channels. To forego all those advantages would incur significant costs for the 
companies, especially when compatible partners with expertise might be lacking in the market. 
The informal side, therefore, gradually creeps in, and serves as a mechanism to undermine 
opportunism where formal legal sanctions are no longer available. In the case there is defection 
in the initial phases of experimental cooperation (in the “contractual milestones”), GILSON et 
al argue that formal legal enforcement should be restricted to “low-powered enforcement”, that 
is, mostly to the restitution of the incurred costs in certain circumstances.41 
A potential contribution to improve relations between companies willing to innovate 
collaboratively would be to further study and present alternative governance mechanisms to be 
included in contracts for innovation. A Recommendation Guide could suggest, for instance, in 
which situations and for which functions different governance mechanisms would be useful and 
how they could interact with each other. 
 
 
38 GILSON, et al, op. cit, 2009; GILSON, et al, op. cit, 2010. See also: GILSON, Ronald J.; SABEL, Charles F.; 
SCOTT, Robert E. Contract and innovation: the limited role of generalist courts in the evolution of novel 
contractual forms. NYUL Rev., v. 88, p. 170, 2013. 
39 See the detailed explanation of the theory, based on three different contracts used to structure innovation, in 
GILSON, et al, op. cit, 2009, página 473 et seq..  
40 Ibid. página 481 et seq.  






5.2 LEGAL DOCTRINE 
 
The role of legal doctrine may be significant to deal with collaborative relationships for 
innovation, whenever the parties are unable to solve their disputes informally or through the 
governance mechanisms established in their agreements. In most cases, parties are able to solve 
disputes arising from collaborative relationships without the need for legal enforcement.42 
However, whenever this might not be possible, legal doctrine might then guide the adjudication 
of disputes involving these ventures or might provide guidance for parties regarding the 
leverage each of them will have in renegotiating their contracts, due to some contingency or 
dispute. 
The main fields that could provide insights to deal with those problems are those dealing 
with relational contract law, contract design and contractual networks. The limitations of 
relational contract law to deal with these collaborative relationships have been indicated above. 
Contract design will be mostly employed by the parties in innovative projects, with particular 
governance mechanisms, such as those indicated in the section above. However, there will be 
situations where these governance mechanisms might not be sufficient to solve all conflicts and 
adjudication will be necessary. Legal studies on long-term contracts might provide relevant 
insights, clarifying how hard and soft law can serve to solve conflicts in collaborative 
relationships. For instance, rules on fundamental change of circumstances, on implied terms, or 
the good faith principle. The limitations of incomplete contracts’ insights, however, are also 
significant. Innovation and especially experimental relationships involve constant uncertainty 
and impossibility to predict the future of the parties’ relationship. It might not possible, for 
instance, for a court to imply a “reasonable” term into the parties’ agreement considering their 
previous behavior: innovative projects involve creating something new or in a new way, for 
which there is no previous reasonable model one could use as a guidance to predict the future. 
Similarly, courts cannot easily identify what is a “reasonable” behavior that is in accordance 
with good faith in such uncertain environment as that of constant innovation.  
A further field of study providing insights for the subject is that of contractual networks. 
Most of the first generation of studies acknowledging the specificity of contractual networks in 
 





general date from the early 1990’s. It is clear how this process of acknowledgment occurs. The 
early studies on the topic dealt with franchising, exploring how the dependence of the 
franchisees upon the franchisor required recasting contractual principles and interpretation.43 
They were then focused upon a form of hierarchical network. To regulate this form of 
hierarchical relationship, the main purpose of Private law would be the protection of the 
weakest link in the network against the all-powerful network leader. But soon after authors such 
as Teubner recognized the existence of heterarchical networks, truly collaborative ventures 
where the parties are all vulnerable in relation to each other due to the spirit of discovery, to the 
uncertainty of their project.44 The legal problems involving hierarchical networks require very 
different responses to those required by heterarchical networks – such as those involving 
collaborative production and distribution.  In the latter case, the issue is not asymmetry and/or 
the protection of the weaker party (apart in some special situations), but rather true 
coordination, monitoring and transparency between the parties, as well as undermining risks 
of opportunism. 
Collaborative relationships involving multiple parties should be distinguished from other 
kinds of transactions which can be classified as “linked contracts”. It is true that the two main 
issues that arise in linked contracts are also present in contractual networks. Conversely, 
however, contractual networks’ most acute legal difficulties are normally not even mentioned 
in the studies regarding linked contracts. 
Linked contracts do not represent at all a new development in terms of the law of 
obligations, but their recognition as a separate group is relatively recent. General examples of 
linked contracts involve purchase financing, cartel agreements, construction projects involving 
a plurality of contracts or chain of sales contract between the producer and the consumer or 
end-user. In these contracts, there are two main legal issues that are presented as requiring 
divergent solutions from mainstream contract law rules.  
The first one is the issue of liability for damages arising between two parties not directly 
connected through contract, inserted in the context of interrelated contractual relationships of 
 
43 See, for instance, SCHANZE, op. cit. 1991.  
44 TEUBNER, Gunther. Beyond Contract and Organization? External Liability of Franchising Systems. In: 
MARTINEK, Michael. Franchising and the Law: Theoretical and Comparative Approaches in Europe and the 





which they were parties.45 Three sub-questions arise regarding this matter: first, the effect of 
exemption clauses between parties to linked contracts; second, the emergence of supplementary 
obligations between parties with no direct contractual relationship; and, third, the issue whether 
a producer might be directly liable for his product in the context of a chain of sales.  
The second issue refers to the effects that linked contracts might have on one another, that 
is, whether the fact that one contract is terminated or breached will imply the termination of the 
other contract.46 Consider, for instance, a case involving purchasing finance, where the 
customer concluded two contracts, one with a constructor for the erection of a building, and 
another one with a financial institution for the financing of the project. In the case of an 
anticipatory breach attributed to the constructor, would that incur in the termination of the 
contract with the purchasing finance and, if so, in what circumstances? 
In European private law studies on contractual networks, the focus has been on two 
general issues: 1) the interpretation of bilateral contracts embedded in the context of a network 
of contracts, especially the intensification of cooperation duties; 2) the extension of the effects 
of bilateral contracts to parties not directly connected to these contracts but actively 
participating in the network.47 Whereas the second issue was already subject to extensive 
discussions in the context of “linked contracts”, it acquires a somewhat different nuance in the 
context of collaborative networks. In those collaborative networks, partners not only are 
interdependent, but maintain either a working relationship or a relation where the modification 
of the other party’s performance requires recasting their own contribution to the network. 
All of these different areas of study provide important contributions for a legal doctrine 
seeking to deal with collaborative relationship typical of the New Economy, but none of them 
alone can solve all the issues presented by them. 
Most collaborative contracts contain very few formal enforceable terms: as the parties do 
not know exactly what and how they will be producing collaboratively until they start 
experimenting, the contracts remain open. They contain, as aforementioned, a procedure for the 
 
45 SAMOY, I.; LOOS, M. B. M., Introduction. In: SAMOY, I; LOOS, M. B. M., Linked Contracts, Cambridge: 
Intersentia, 2009.  
46 Ibid. página 6. 
47 GRUNDMANN, Stefan. Contractual Networks in German Private Law. In: CAFAGGI, Fabrizio. Contractual 






continuous specification of their duties as their relationship evolves and general duties of 
cooperation to guide their behavior.  
In this context, an important contribution to international trade organizations would be to 
establish what would be the particular content of duties of cooperation in the context of 
collaborative experimental relationships.  What are exactly those duties, what do they entail 
and how do they differ from traditional duties of cooperation in non-collaborative relationships? 
Such duties include a duty of confidentiality, duties to provide information, duties to cooperate 
and to act in good faith, sometimes, if the contract so provides, duties to share profits, to treat 
different parties participating in the collaborative project non-discriminatorily or to provide for 
a non-opportunistic termination of the project, if one of the parties made significant preliminary 
investments.  
In other words, that would be a contribution towards rethinking Private law in light of 
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